Detectors, Electronics, and Algorithms for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Safeguards, and Homeland Security Applications

Sara A. Pozzi

Department of Nuclear Engineering and Radiological Sciences, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109





#### Outline

- Motivation
- MCNP-PoliMi Code System
- Scintillation Detectors
- Scalable-Platform Electronics
- Analysis Algorithms for SNM Identification
- Conclusions
- Upcoming Events



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#### **Preventing Nuclear Terrorism**

Grand Challenge - National Academy of Engineering

"It should not be assumed," write physicists Richard Garwin and Georges Charpak, "that terrorists or other groups wishing to make nuclear weapons cannot read." Consequently, the main obstacle to a terrorist planning a nuclear nightmare would be acquiring fissile material plutonium or highly enriched uranium capable of rapid nuclear fission. Nearly 2 million kilograms of each have already been produced and exist in the world today. It takes less than ten kilograms of plutonium, or a few tens of kilograms of highly enriched uranium, to build a bomb.



Source: National Academy of Engineering website



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#### **Resurgence of Nuclear Power**

Challenge # 2 – Safeguarding Nuclear Fuel

- The resurgence of nuclear power requires advanced materials control and accounting techniques for nuclear fuel reprocessing in order to prevent diversions, ensure safety, and reassure the international community
- Near real-time accountability measurements are needed for material at all stages of the fuel cycle
- Quantification of Pu-239 and other fissile isotopes





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#### **Detection Technology**

Challenge # 3 – Replacement Technology for He-3 Neutron Detection

- <sup>3</sup>He counters are widely deployed in radiation portal monitors
  - They are a common choice for detecting neutrons
    - Energy information is lost
    - □ <sup>3</sup>He is currently in short supply
- Candidates for <sup>3</sup>He replacement should have:
  - 1. High efficiency
  - 2. Reliable neutron/gamma-ray discrimination
  - 3. Neutron spectroscopic capabilities









### Description of Simulation Tools MCNP-PoliMi Monte Carlo Code

- MCNP-PoliMi was developed to simulate correlation measurements with neutrons and gamma rays
- Unique features:
  - 1. Physics of particle transport (MCNP-PoliMi code)

 Prompt neutrons and gamma rays associated with each event are modeled explicitly; neutron and photon-induced fission multiplicity distributions have been implemented



Improved simulation of correlation and multiplicity distributions

2. Physics of detection (Detector Response Module)
**Each collision** in the detector is treated individually
Improved simulation of detector response



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# MCNP-PoliMi Code System Detector Response Simulation Capabilities

- MCNP-PoliMi was developed to simulate correlated particle interactions on an event-byevent basis
- The code allows for high-fidelity detector response simulation:
  - 1. Nonlinearity in the light output from neutron collisions
  - 2. Varying light output from carbon and hydrogen collisions
  - 3. Pulse generation time within the scintillator
  - 4. Detector dead time
  - 5. Detector resolution is being implemented





### MCNP-PoliMi Code System Scintillator Resolution Implementation

The resolution functions are x 10<sup>4</sup> Measured C I=2 60e6 based on measured plastic-18 Simulation I=3.08e6 scintillator data No Resolution 16 14 40 Current Resolution ICx Plastic Resolution 12 Absolute Counts 35  $R(E) = A \cdot E + B\sqrt{E} + C$ 10 30 25 FWHM/E (%) 20 15 10 00000 5 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 Pulse Height (MeVee) n 200 400 2000 600 1400 1600 1800 Energy (keV



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## Passive Measurements in Ispra, Italy Cross-Correlations of Plutonium Oxide

- Measurements of PuO<sub>2</sub> standards were performed in August, 2008 at the JRC in Ispra, Italy
- Passive cross-correlation data was acquired using six cylindrical EJ-309 liquid scintillation detectors
  - Offline pulse shape discrimination (PSD) was used to separate the neutron and gamma contributions







#### Passive Measurements in Ispra, Italy Measurement Summary

- We collected approximately 10k correlations for each of five different samples:
  - 1. Low burnup, 100 g
  - 2. Low burnup, 300 g
  - 3. Low burnup, 500 g
  - 4. High burnup, 50 g
  - 5. High burnup, 100 g



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#### Sample Isotopics (mass percent)

lsotope	Low Burnup	High Burnup
Pu-238	0.20%	1.72%
Pu-239	70.96%	58.10%
Pu-240	24.58%	24.77%
Pu-241	3.29%	9.77%
Pu-242	0.98%	5.65%



## Passive Measurements in Ispra, Italy





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# Measured Data Low-Burnup PuO<sub>2</sub>, 500 g



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#### Passive Detection Results Simulated and Measured





#### Passive Measurements of MOX Experimental Geometry

- Idaho National Laboratory
- Zero-Power Physics Reactor Facility (ZPPR)
- Measurement of Mixed-Oxide Fuel pins (MOX)







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#### Passive Measurements of MOX Material Composition

	Pin #1	<b>Pin #2</b>	
Diameter [cm]	0.97	0.97	90 pi
Length [cm]	15.24	15.24	PHT-2
MOX weight [g]	89.55	89.78	12-80-21
Total Pu weight [g]	11.74	14.01	Gross - 932
Pu-238	0.01	0.01	- Tare - 160
Pu-239	10.19	9.81	u- 60
Pu-240	1.36	3.66	Pa 104
Pu-241	0.04	0.15	Iso 91
Pu-242	0.02	0.02	MANA MATTACANA
Am-241	0.16	0.51	
Total U weight [g]	66.90	64.58	
U-235	0.15	0.14	
U-238	66.75	64.45	
O-16	10.57	10.59	
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#### Monte Carlo Simulation MCNP-PoliMi Model





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#### Monte Carlo Simulation MCNP-PoliMi Model





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#### Material Characterization pin type #1 vs. pin type #2 (100 pin arrays)

Neutron Creation Data	Pin #1	Pin #2
Neutrons/sec from Spontaneous Fission	1426.1	3767.9
Neutrons/sec from (alpha,n) Reactions	854.3	1414.7
Neutrons/sec from Induced Fission	278.6	665.7
Average Energy of Neutrons from Spontaneous Fissions	1.98	1.98
Average Energy of Neutrons from (alpha,n) Reactions [MeV]	2.30	2.31
Average Energy of Neutrons from Induced Fission [MeV]	1.69	1.69

Photon Creation Data	Pin #1	Pin #2
Photons/sec from Spontaneous Fission	4261.1	11258.4
Photons/sec from (alpha,n) Reactions	645.7	1132.1
Average Energy of Photons from Spontaneous Fissions	0.94	0.94
Average Energy of Photons from (alpha,n) Reactions [MeV]	0.76	0.74





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#### **Simulation Results and Comparison** Neutron Energy Spectra and Average Energy

- The quantity of MOX fuel material effects the emitted neutron energy distribution
- As the number of fuel pins increases the average neutron energy decreases



#### Simulation Results and Comparison Neutron Energy Spectra

- The combination of six MCNP-PoliMi sources provide the anticipated neutron energy distributions for the 90 fuel pin can
- Neutron energy tally on the exterior of the fuel pin can



ENDF/B-VII.0 (USA, 2006)





#### Measurement Results Cross-Correlation Functions





12 minute acquisition, 90 pins of #2,40 cm detector distance, 70 keVeethreshold, 2 in lead shielding

- PSD allows for study of individual components of the cross-correlation curve
- neutron-neutron correlations provide information on fission events



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# Measurement Results

#### **Cross-Correlation Functions**

- Comparison of (n,n) to (n,p) and (p,n) correlations:
  - Pin #1—0.74
  - Pin #2—2.34



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April 22, 2010



# Measurement vs. Simulation

#### **Cross-Correlation Functions**

- Good agreement in neutron-neutron correlations
- High gamma-ray background from radioactive decay of fuel elements hinders good photon related correlations





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## Capture-Gated Detectors Working Concept

#### **Capture-gated detectors**\* provide **enhanced neutron spectroscopic information**

- Initial neutron scattering pulses is followed by capture pulse
- Size of the scattering pulse is directly related to the initial neutron energy

**Capture-gated neutron spectroscopy** can be performed by adding material(s) with high  $\sigma_a$  for thermal neutrons (<sup>10</sup>B, <sup>6</sup>Li, <sup>nat</sup>Gd, Cd, etc.)





\*G.F. Knoll, Radiation Detection and Measurement, third Ed., Wiley, New York, 2000, p. 570.



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#### Passive Measurements, <sup>6</sup>Li Detector <u>Heterogeneous</u>, <sup>6</sup>Li Glass/Plastic Scintillator

- The detector consists of 7 slabs (4 BC-408 and 3 GS20 slabs)
- 1 Ci <sup>239</sup>Pu-Be source shielded by 2 in. of lead
- The source was placed 30 cm from the detector
- Ratio of neutron captures from all neutron collisions: 2.5%







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# Scintillation Detectors: <sup>10</sup>B-Liquid *Measurement Results*

- Saint-Gobain BC-523A homogeneous detector based on liquid scintillator BC-501A
- The detector is loaded with 4.41%wt. of <sup>10</sup>B
- Large thermal-neutron capture cross section (3858 barns) is utilized to produce capture pulses





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Q Scattering pull

# Scintillation Detectors: Cd-Plastic

#### Measurement Results

- CAEN V1720 waveform digitizer
  - 12-bit vertical resolution
  - 250-MHz sapling rate (4-ns step)
  - DNNG data-acquisition software
- Cadmium detector at 15 cm from a <sup>252</sup>Cf source
  - U = 1350 V
  - ~ 62000 neutrons/s from the source
  - ~ 3300 neutrons/s at the face of the detector
- Binary data files obtained
  - Measurement time 300 s, 8 files
  - ~740,000 pulses/file
  - 100 points/pulse
- Thresholds
  - Measurement threshold = 75 keVee
  - Coincidence (capture-gated) window =  $40 \mu s$



0.1 mm Cd foil

1 cm plastic scintillator

reflective coating

photomultiplier tube







### Scintillation Detectors: Cd-Plastic MCNP-PoliMi Simulation Results

21 cm

- The MCNP-PoliMi code produces a specialized output file detailing all collisions within a detector
- DNNG-developed algorithms analyze the information in this file to predict detector response
- Result Examples
  - Positions of a specific collision type in detector
  - Track histories with description of collision types

33 cm





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### Scalable-Platform Electronics Digitizer Development

#### CAEN V1720 waveform digitizer

- 12-bit vertical resolution
- 250-MHz sampling rate (4-ns step)
- 8 channels
- 2-V dynamic range
- One motherboard FPGA
- 8-channel FPGAs
- DNNG custom-made data-acquisition software
- Optimized for offline mode
- FPGA waveform digitizer
  - 14-bit vertical resolution
  - 250-MHz sampling rate
  - 4 channels
  - 2-V dynamic range
  - One FPGA
  - DNNG custom-made data-acquisition software
  - Optimized for online mode









### Scalable-Platform Electronics Platform Description

- The electronics developed in this project will allow extraction of very low-energy pulses
- Such pulses are generated from neutrons depositing very little energy within the scintillators
- Accurately measured lowenergy portion of the fission spectrum will lead to more accurate neutron spectroscopy



Fast, robust identification and characterization



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## Scalable-Platform Electronics Platform Analysis Algorithms

- Normalized Cross Correlation
- Widely used in template matching for image processing, wireless communication etc
- 2x improvements in probability of detection
- Real-time detection
- Simulations show lowest detectable energy to be 3 keVee
- Eventually real-time PSD on FPGA





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# Analysis Algorithms Digital Pulse Shape Discrimination (PSD)

- Detector pulses are digitized at 250 MHz
- Each pulse is integrated offline and classified by comparison to a discrimination line





This technique breaks down at low detection thresholds (200-keV neutron energy deposited)



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#### Analysis Algorithms Reference-Pulses PSD

- To improve low-energy PSD, neutron and gamma-ray reference pulses have been created
- This allows for higher-fidelity measurements of fission spectra







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#### Analysis Algorithms Neutron Spectrum Unfolding

- Neutron pulse height distributions are related to the neutron energy spectra  $N(L) = \int R(E_n, L) \Phi(E_n) dE_n$
- Advanced algorithms are needed to "unfold" the energy spectra





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## Upcoming Measurement Campaign Fissile Samples in Ispra, Italy, June 2010

- Measurements of MOX powder (2 kg total mass) will be performed using capture-gated and traditional scintillators as well as <sup>3</sup>He tubes
- Cross-correlation, pulse height, and multiplicity data will be acquired







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# Upcoming Measurement Campaign Los Alamos LANSCE Facility, July/August 2010

- Previous experiments at LANSCE have measured the fission neutron energy spectrum of <sup>235</sup>U and <sup>239</sup>Pu above 1 MeV
- A significant fraction of the neutrons from fission lies below
  1 MeV – these measurements will extend the data down to approximately 100 keV
- Measurements will be performed using a DNNG-developed digital data-acquisition and pulseshape-discrimination system







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# **New Courses Available in NERS**

#### **Detection Techniques for Nuclear Nonproliferation**

- Nuclear nonproliferation; homeland security
- Introduction to the physics of nuclear fission
- Monte Carlo simulations for nuclear nonproliferation applications
- Passive and active inspection of SNM
- Detectors and safeguards instruments
- Winter 2008 17 students
- Fall 2009 19 students



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#### **Nuclear Safeguards**

Collaboration with the Oak Ridge National Lab Safeguards Lab user facility



- History of nuclear safeguards
- International safeguards policy
- Nondestructive assay techniques
- Typical safeguards instruments for neutron and gamma-ray detection
- Data analysis for nuclear material identification and characterization





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# **Summary and Conclusions**

- Nuclear nonproliferation and homeland security challenges require the development of new detectors, electronics, and algorithms for SNM detection and characterization
- Our effort at UM is a three-pronged approach to identifying suitable technology: new detectors, new electronics, and new algorithms
  - Several new scintillation detectors have been developed and evaluation is currently underway
  - A scalable electronics platform is being developed: initial tests indicate two-fold improvement in SNM detection probability
  - Cutting-edge analysis algorithms are under development to allow reliable fast neutron spectroscopy for SNM identification and classification



#### Detection for Nuclear Nonproliferation Group

Department of Nuclear Engineering and Radiological Sciences - University of Michigan Group Leader: Sara Pozzi

#### **Group Members**

- Marek Flaska, Assistant Research Scientist
- Shaun Clarke, Assistant Research Scientist
- Andreas Enqvist, Postdoctoral Researcher
- Eric Miller, Graduate Student
- Jennifer Dolan , Graduate Student
- Shikha Prasad, Graduate Student
- Jeff Katalenich, Graduate Student
- Christopher Lawrence, Graduate Student
- Alexis Poitrasson-Riviere, Graduate Student
- Mark Bourne , Graduate Student
- Bill Walsh, Graduate Student
- 8 Undergraduate Students

#### **Collaborators – National**

- Robert Haight, Los Alamos National Laboratory
- Alan Hunt, Idaho Accelerator Center
- Donald Umstadter, University of Nebraska
- Peter Vanier, Brookhaven National Laboratory
- John Mattingly, Sandia National Laboratory
- Andrey Gueorgueiv, ICx Radiation

#### **Collaborators – International**

- Imre Pazsit, Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden
- Enrico Padovani, Polytechnic of Milan, Italy
- Paul Scoullar, Southern Innovation, Australia
- Peter Schillebeeckx, JRC Geel Belgium
- Senada Avdic, University of Tulsa, Bosnia



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